Lecture 16

Scaling.

Today)

c. ↳ Finish PoS.

↳ Scaling

PoS

$H(\text{randSource}, pk, t) < T_x \cdot \text{Stake}(pk)$

randSource updated periodically.

↳ Require consensus randSource

VRFEval (randSource, t, sk)

(y, π) ↳ proof.

VRFVerify $(y, \pi, \text{randSource}, t, pk)$

↳ {True, False}.

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s-truncated LC.

Props

CONS:

(i) Leadership slot is self-predictable

(ii) Not fully dynamic available

Setting



Long range attack.

PoSAT (Proof-of-Stake with Arrow-of-Time).

Verifiable Delay Functions. (VDF).

↳ Mechanism to certify the passage of time

x → input.

Want
Calculate $H^t(x) = H(H(H(\cdots H(x))$

↳ Sequentially calculate hashes.

<u>key idea:</u> Not parallelizable.

↳ 'T' time to compute hash ⇒ T_t time to compute H^t.

[Not easy to verify $H^t(x) = y$.

[Verification and computation take same time]

Cryptographic mechanisms to create a short proof that $H^t(x) = y$.

<u>VDF Prove</u> & <u>VDF Verify</u>.

↓ ↓

prover Verifier.

↳ ($H^t(x)$ and a proof) ↳ (Verify quickly $H^t(x) = y$ using proof)

$H(\text{randSource}, pk, \perp) < \text{fn. Stake}(pk)$

random

$H^{\perp}(\text{randSource}, pk) < \text{fn. Stake}(pk) \Rightarrow LC$

[Ignore verifier complexity.]

↳ can be dealt using VDF.

'is available is

↓ the time at which —

unpredictable even by yourself

Earlier: RandSource → fixed at genesis.

Now: RandSource ⟹ H^L(randSource, pk) in the previous block.

↓ comes from prev block. LC.



(No notion of time in the protocol)



Assumption $H^L(.)$ takes same amount of time for all nodes.

↳ Rate of (seq work) is same across all nodes

[No benefit of parallelism].

Noticing at attack stake



T tim

⇒ LC ?

L

Branching random walks ⇒ Without attack, LC → nT

With attack, LC → neT

≈ 2.7

Secure as long as $\lambda_h^{(t)} > c\, \lambda_a^{(t}$

?

1

C-correlation ⇒ $\lambda_h^{(t)} > \phi_c\, \lambda_a^{(t)}$

$\phi_c \to 1$ as $c \to \infty$