

Foundations of Blockchain Systems

Course: EE 595, Autumn 2020.

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Bitcoin

Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

Satoshi Nakamoto
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BITCOIN IS A
CRYPTOCURRENCY




LAUNCHED IN
JANUARY 2009



VERY SECURE:
SAFETY AND
LIVENESS

Why Blockchain – 1: The Evolutionary Argument

“Humans cooperate flexibly in large numbers” – Harari in Sapiens



PHASE 1

TRIBAL TRUST



PHASE 2

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST





















PHASE 3

DISTRIBUTED TRUST

Why Blockchain -2: The Economic Argument

Digital Commons = controlled by a few digital platforms (intermediaries)

2018					2008				
RANK	COMPANY		FOUNDED	USBn	RANK	COMPANY		FOUNDED	USBn
1.	 *		1976	890	1.	 PetroChina		1999	728
2.	 *		1998	768	2.	 EXXON		1870	492
3.	 *		1975	680	3.			1892	358
4.	 *		1994	592	4.	 中国移动 China Mobile		1997	344
5.	 *		2004	545	5.	 ICBC		1984	336
6.	 Tencent 腾讯 *		1998	526	6.	 GAZPROM		1989	332
7.	BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY		1955	496	7.	 Microsoft		1975	313
8.	 Alibaba.com *		1999	488	8.			1907	266
9.	 Johnson & Johnson		1886	380	9.			2000	257
10.	J.P.Morgan		1871	375	10.	 AT&T		1885	238


Digital Intermediaries run the modern world



Digital intermediaries *aggregate information* and do market making

Leading to high centralization of power in the AI era

Bitcoin is THE bubble of all time



Why Blockchain -3: The Technical Argument

Central role for theoretical design

Adversarial behavior requires security proofs

Central role for theoretical analysis

Randomness for symmetry breaking & unpredictability

Resource-dependent randomness – Proof-of-work, proof-of-space, proof-of-stake

Many ideas required

Information theory

Sharp threshold analysis

Typicality

Coding theory

Network coding

Distributed storage

Networking


P2P design

Game theory


Incentives

Distributed Computing -> Blockchain

Operating Systems
R. Stockton Gaines
Editor
Time, Clocks, and the Ordering of Events in a Distributed System
Leslie Lamport
Massachusetts Computer Associates, Inc.



Permissioned network
(*authorized* nodes)



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Permissionless network
(*any* node)




ethereum




Applications far beyond currencies
=> Cooperate without digital intermediary





The Promise Big Gap




Infrastructure to applications




Blockchain Today

	Security	Latency	Energy Efficiency	Throughput
Bitcoin	 50% adversary	 3 hours	 ~Sweden	 10 Tx/Sec
Desired	50% adversary	200 ms	No wastage	1 Million Tx/Sec


The blockchain trilemma



Principal challenge: Scalability

Solving Blockchain's Biggest Problem: 5 Projects Working On Scalability
August 23, 2018 By Jorn van Zwanenburg  1

Blockchain's Scaling Problem, Explained


 Connor Blenkinsop

 AUG 22, 2018

7 Challenges That Need to be Addressed Before Blockchain Mass Adoption is Possible

Blockchain Scalability: The Issues, and Proposed Solutions



BitRewards 
Apr 25, 2018 · 4 min read

Consensus protocol mania



- Different security guarantees and decentralization
- How far can we go?

Layers of Blockchain

	Metrics	Ideas
Application	Decentralized finance	Game theory and Mechanism design
Sharding	Scale storage and compute	Codes for blockchain Resource allocation
Consensus	Security, throughput, latency, fairness	Protocol design Stochastic analysis
Peer2Peer	Optimize Latency and bandwidth	Network design for broadcast / multicast

Two distinct Lens: Adversarial & Rational

Two models

Adversarial

<50% of nodes are adversarial

Remaining honest nodes follow protocol

Rational

Each node acts on self-interest

Is the protocol a Nash-equilibrium?

Dominant strategy?

- Do we need to assume that the node colludes in only small coalition?